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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation is written as a part of the MSc in Energy Systems. This study 
investigates if the presence of corruption or poor institutions has any effect on 
promoting the renewable energy.   Alternative models including corruption and 
institutional estimates among the main drivers promoting   renewable energy are 
estimated. A set of eighty countries with yearly data from 2001 to 2011 is being used. 
Panel data methodology of Fixed Effects and Random Effects is being applied. With the 
estimation of different models that include the corruption and institutional estimates 
we demonstrate the main drivers of the renewable energy. The main drivers of 
renewables are estimated to be the share of the common energy resources and the GDP 
per capita. The CO2 emission per capita, the energy use per capita, the growth of GDP 
and the share of energy imports are not estimated as significant drivers for the 
renewables. Regarding the corruptions and the institutional estimates, only the 
Government effectiveness was proven to have a significant negative link with the share 
of renewables. The links between the CPI, the Control of Corruption and the 
Government Effectiveness are presented but they are not found significant.  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this study is to investigate which are the main drivers in the increased penetration of 
renewable energy systems. The drivers that are considered are not only social or economical. The 
scope is to investigate if the presence of corruption or other estimates of poor quality of the 
institutions have an effect on the growth of renewable energy systems and applications. The 
analysis uses different estimation models in order to accumulate all the variables. The 
methodology is based on the most common techniques (OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects) in 
the estimations of panel data. The analysis is conducted for eighty countries with the time span 
from 2001 to 2011 using yearly data. 
 
According to the definition of the International Energy Agency (IEA), renewable energy is the 
energy derived from natural resources that are replenished at a faster rate than they are 
consumed. Common sources of renewables are considered the solar, wind, hydro and some forms 
of biomass. The applications of renewables are many but the main is the electricity generation. 
Renewables are considered the main alternative in order to avoid and adheres the increasing 
global warming. Renewables are also considered a main contributor in the energy diversification of 
a country. The increase in energy diversification increases the energy security that is currently 
considered as an important section of the modern energy policy. 
 
For those reasons it is important to investigate which are the main drivers of the growth of the 
renewable energy systems. But as it is obvious it is not only the different economical factors that 
affect the renewable energy systems. There are also certain political and social factors also effect 
the decision of implementing the different policies. But it is essentially the quality of institutions 
that control the policies, which is the unobserved main driver that affect the implementation of a 
certain policy. 
 
The literature extensively examines the link between institutions and resource abundance. The 
evidence of the influence of resources policies under the presence of corruption are presented by 
many authors [Sachs and Warner (1995),Leite and Weidemann(1999) etc.]. However, only recently 
Gennaioli and Tavoni (2011) refered on the presence of a resource curse on renewable energy 
resources. They concluded that inefficient institutions can lead to adverse effect on policies. 
The evaluation of renewable energy policy was investigated by many authors [Carley (2009), 
Marques and Fuinhas(2012) etc]. They all investigated which are the main drivers of the renewable 
energy policy using different variables. Marques,Fuinhas and  Manso (2010) reviewed extensively 
the main drivers of the promotion of renewable energy. 
 
This study is organized as following. Section 2 extensively reviews the literature of the drivers of 
the renewable energy. Section 3 presents the models and analytical framework used in the 
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analysis. Section 4 described the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents and describes the 
empirical findings. Section 6 provides the concluding remarks and the discussion of the findings. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Our scope is to investigate which are the main drivers in the penetration of renewable energy 
systems. The area of our concentration is the effect of the quality of the institutions or the 
presence corruption on the renewable energy. We also want to investigate what are the main 
socioeconomic factors that drive the growth of the renewable energy share in the total energy 
supply. Since the literature in this area is minimum, we start our review from the point of how the 
exploitation of natural resources and the environment is affected by institutions. Then we focus on 
the presence of corruption or low quality institutions in the formation of the environmental policy. 
Finally we review the literature in order to identify, which are the main factors that have effect on 
the implementation of the renewable energy systems. 
The exploitation of natural resources and its economic impact has been an important area of 
discussion among economic literature. The main contributor is Auty (1993,1997,2001) who 
introduced the natural resource curse.  Based on historical evidence he concludes that regions 
with abundant natural resources continue to have low income per capita and apparently low levels 
of economic growth. Although the low levels of economic growth can be interpretated by the 
presence of low quality institutions in the perception of corruption. Both Mauro (1995) and Mo 
(2000) using empirical methods conclude that corruption has an effect on economic growth using 
the corruption as a control for the institutions performance. 
 Sachs and Warner (1995) made a major contribution in the natural resource curse literature, by 
introducing the first econometric evidence that incorporates the institution’s quality.  They used 
some institutional index that incorporates corruption following   Mauro’s (1995) approach among 
other explanatory variables, finding a negative association between natural resource abundance 
and growth. Based on these findings Leite and Weidemann (1999) theoretically and empirically 
investigates the link between the natural resources and growth through the channel of corruption 
and institutional quality. They conclude that the level of corruption depends on the abundance of 
natural resources and the institution’s operating regime .Their results further support the negative 
growth effect of natural resources, which is affected by the corruption and the institutional quality.  
Although a more resent study from Brunnschweiler (2006) has findings that contradict the 
previous resource curse literature.  Her results indicate a positive relationship between natural 
resources (in this case mineral resources) and the GDP growth and between natural resources and 
the GDP growth and institutional quality. 
Some other authors have implemented the use of the democracy index as an institution indicator. 
Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2009) investigate how natural resources effect corruption and if the 
democratic institutions have impact in this process. They conclude that resource rents increase 
corruption and this relationship depends on the quality of democratic institutions. Neumayer 
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(2002) investigates the link between democracies and environmental commitment. Although his 
findings support a positive link, his findings can have no implementation on the formation of 
policy. 
Kolstad and Søreide (2009) have reviewed extensively the literature on natural resources and 
corruption. They conclude that corruption is the main contributor for the resource curse 
phenomenon. Rent-seeking and patronage are the main forms of corruption in countries that have 
abundant natural resources. Their suggestions focus on the implementation of policies that 
intercept and comprise those forms of corruption. Damania(2002) tried to investigate the 
presence  of corruption in the environmental regulators,  the institutions that are responsible for 
the synthesis and implementation of the environmental policy.  He concludes that corruption can 
have an effect on the regulators, leading to diminishing enforcement of the perceived policy. 
Although these findings are based only on a theoretical and not an empirical model and further 
investigation is suggested. 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) discuss the determinants of environmental policies’ austerity in 
European Union, assessing the environmental regulators’ performance. They conclude that 
corruption has a strong adverse effect on policy stringency, which is greater than the income’s 
positive effect. Their suggestions for the environmental policy focus on the further control of 
corruption and the improvement of institutional quality in the low income countries. Lapatinas, 
Litina and Sartzetakis (2013) theoretically demonstrate an alternative perspective of the affect of 
corruption on environmental policy.  It is argued that the environmental policy’s effectiveness can 
be reduced by the presence of corruption, through the exploitation of the environment’s public 
funds from policy makers. 
 Some authors investigated the link between policy formation, corruption and the political 
institutions. Fredriksson and Svensson (2002) developed a theoretical model of environmental 
policy formation considering the levels of corruption and political instability. Their empirical 
evidence supports their theoretical findings, suggesting that corruption has a negative effect on 
the performance of the environmental regulators and that the interaction of corruption and 
political instability is significant and important. However the political instability does not seem to 
have an effect on policy formation. Damania and Wilson (2004) construct a theoretical model to 
incorporate in the environmental policy and the environmental outcomes, the effects of the 
corruption and the political competition. Their results suggest that political competition leads to 
the adoption of tighter environmental policies and better environmental protection, although the 
effect of corruption on the policy formation cannot be eliminated. Fredriksson and Vollebergh 
(2009) investigate the effect of corruption on the environmental policy formation under the scope 
of different structures of political intuitions, and especially the presence of federalism. Their 
results suggest that government corruption diminish the energy policy measures. However this 
result is not valid when we take in to consideration the enforcement of the federal systems, where 
the effect of corruption is reduced. 
In the literature it is extensively reviewed how the natural resource management policies are 
influenced by the presence of corruption. Based on this relationship some authors [Sachs and 
Warner (1995), Leite and Weidemann (1999) ,etc]  find evidence of the existence of the resource 
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curse. However until recently there was no reference on the presence of a resource curse in the 
renewable energy resources. This contribution comes from Gennaioli and Tavoni (2011), in their 
effort to assess the potential for resource curse in the renewable energy sector.  
They establish both theoretical and empirical approach to analyze the relationship between the 
policy schemes for wind energy and the opportunity for rent-seeking and corruption. In their 
political economy approach the model of corruption allows the entrepreneur to decide whether to 
invest in the wind energy in a province and if he will make the bride to the politicians. The 
theoretical approach findings suggest that not only wind level but also the social and political 
institutions influence the expansion of the wind energy. These findings are consistent according to 
their empirical approach that estimates the level of criminal association. They concluded that 
poorly functioning institutions can lead to adverse effect of efficient policies. 
 However this approach needs to be criticized thoroughly. First of all the data originates only from 
Italy and in order to draw sufficient policy suggestions a larger sample of countries is required. 
Although their theoretical appears to take in to consideration the possible income of the 
investment decision, the empirical evidence does not use any explanatory variable for the level of 
income. So it is not possible to draw any assessment on resource curse, but   only on the effects of 
corruption on the expansion of wind energy. In addition, the corruption is not estimated by a 
widely used index but by the violent crime index that is calculated for the specific country. 
Moreover their approach does not consider the other renewable energy resources that are 
available since the models are specifically oriented only on the wind energy. 
In order to design and implement effective energy and environmental policy it is vital to 
understand the relationship between energy and economic growth. This has been investigated 
thoroughly in the energy economics literature. Many authors [Soytas and Sari(2003 and 2007), Lee 
and Chang (2005) and Payne (2008)] cannot find a clear and unified result, but only country 
specific results. However recent studies [Apergis and Payne(2009), Belke,Dreger and De 
Haan(2010) and  Sharma(2010)] using advance econometric estimation methods and new 
empirical models find a positive strong bi-directional relationship between energy consumption 
and growth . 
Recently there is a growing literature investigating the relationship between renewable energy and 
economic growth. Apergis and Payne (2009 and 2010) find empirical evidence on the presence of a 
positive bi-directional causality between renewable energy consumption and economic growth in 
the OECD and Eurasia countries respectively. Menegaki (2010) also estimates a positive 
relationship between renewable energy and GDP, although there are no evidence for the presence 
of a casual relationship between renewable energy and economic growth. Chien and Hu (2008) 
using a Structural Equation Modeling conclude that renewable energy has positive effect on GDP 
only through the channel of capital formation and not the channel of energy imports. Marques and 
Fuinhas (2012) find a negative relationship between economic growth and the share of renewable 
resources in energy supply. 
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In the scope of the global warming Menyah and Walde-Rufael (2010) examine the relationship 
between carbon dioxide emissions, renewable and nuclear energy production and GDP in US. Their 
empirical evidence suggests that nuclear energy consumption can reduce CO2 emissions, although 
renewable energy has no effect on emissions. The causality effect on renewable is positive from 
emissions, negative from GDP and insignificant from nuclear resources. Menyah and Walde-Rufael 
with Apergis and Payne (2010) have revised the previous article by using an error correction model 
for a group of 19 countries. In the long –run emissions are negatively affected by nuclear energy 
and positively by renewable energy.  Although in the short-run the nuclear can reduce CO2 
emissions, renewable have no effect on emissions. The renewable energy in the short-run have a 
negative association with nuclear and emissions and positive with economic growth. 
 
The evaluation of the renewable energy policy is constant in the literature. Gan, Eskeland and 
Kolshus(2005) asses the different renewable energy policy instruments in electricity  at the regions 
of Europe and US. They suggest the presence of more crystallized and sound policy objectives, 
increased focus on research and development, selection of the best mixture of policy instruments 
and improved capacity for effective policy implementation. Jenner (2010) evaluates the impact 
Feed-in Tariffs among different renewable energy technologies, through an extensive econometric 
model. The evidence suggests that Feed-in Tariffs were effective only in some forms of renewable 
energy and policy structure should be country-specific and technology-specific. 
 
The evaluation of the renewable energy policy has been empirically investigated by many authors. 
Huang, Alavalapati, Carter and Langholtz (2007) investigate the different factors that affect the 
adoption of renewable portfolio standards (RPS) in individual states of United States (U.S). As 
explanatory variables are used the Gross state product (GSP), growth rate of population (GRP), 
political party dominancy, education level, natural resources expenditure, and share of coal in 
electricity generation. The empirical results suggest that education affects positively most the 
adoption of RPS, followed by the state product (GSP) and the growth of population (GRP). The 
political party domain and the natural resource expenditure have negative effect on the adoption 
of RPS. Yin and Power (2009) introduce a new measurement method for the RPS and investigate 
the impact on the renewable electricity. They conclude that the adoption of policy has a positive 
influence on the share of renewable and that only the energy import ratio from the socio-
economic variables of energy has a significant positive effect  on the renewable’ share. Carley 
(2009) also evaluates the effectiveness of RPS in the share of renewable energy. The empirical 
evidence suggests mixed results of the significance of the RPS policy. From the explanatory 
variables only the level of the state product seems to have a consistent positive effect on the share 
of renewable energy. Marques and Fuinhas(2012) investigate the impact of renewable policy in 
the European Union. They empirically test among other drives of the renewable, the effect of the 
policies on the share of renewable. They conclude that public policy supporting renewable have a 
consistent positive effect on the share of renewable. From the other explanatory variables only the 
available energy seems to positive relationship with the share of renewable. Emissions, energy 
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imports and the other electricity production methods have negative relationship with the 
renewable energy.  
 
Marques, Fuinhas and Manso(2010) investigate what are the main drivers for the promotion and  
growth of renewable energy systems. They use as explanatory variables for the political, socio-
economical and the country specific factors. The empirical results are based on data for a panel of 
European countries. Their evidence suggests that traditional energy resources and CO2 emissions 
have negative effect on the deployment of renewable resources. The target of reducing energy 
dependency promotes the renewable, but the prices of the energy products do not seem to be 
statistically significant.  The GDP seems to have significant effect on renewable’s promotion only in 
the EU members. 
 
From reviewing the literature some major conclusions can be drawn. As most of the authors agree 
that the exercise of environmental or energy policy can be affected by the presence of corruption 
in the different levels of the institutions. The presence of corruption also affects the renewable 
energy policies as Gennaioli and Tavoni (2011). The recent empirical studies that investigate the 
relationship between renewable energy and growth suggest the existence of a positive by-
directional relationship. The attempts of policy evaluations in literature have highlighted the major 
drivers that affect the growth of renewable energy systems. The share of conventional energy 
methods, the energy imports and the level of emissions tend to be the most significant drivers. 
Our approach on investigating the drivers of renewable energy systems has the novelty of 
incorporating the quality of institutions and corruption closing the gap that exists in the literature. 
 
3. Methodology  
In this paragraph, we will analyze the panel equation using the fixed effects and random effects 
approach. In the random effects we will use all three approaches. Then we test the results under 
the two main hypothesis tests. The f-test and Haussmann test. 
 
 
3.1 Panel estimation 
 
A panel data model may specified according to the following model: 
'it it ity X uα β= + +                    (1) 
 
Where it
y
 is the dependent variable, it
X
is a K-vector of regressors, and it
u
 are the error terms for 
1,2,...,i M=  cross-sectional units observed for dated periods 1,2,...,t T= . The parameter α  
represents the overall constant of the model and β   are coefficients K n× , where n is the number 
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of different regressors. The most recent panel data methodology utilizes a two – way error 
component model for the disturbances, with : 
it i t itu µ λ ε= + +                     (2) 
Where i
µ
  denotes the unobserved individual (cross-section) effect, t
λ
 denotes the unobservable 
time effect and it
ε
 is the remainder stochastic disturbance term. 
 
Expressing the above equations as a set of M cross-sectional equations with T observations 
stacked one over another we derive the following equation: 
 
'i T i it i T T iy J X J Iα β µ λ ε= + + + +        (3) 
 
for 1,2,...,i M= , where TJ is a T -element unit vector, TI is the T -element identity matrix , and λ
is a vector containing all the period effects, 1 2
' ( , ,..., )Tλ λ λ λ= . 
 
Likewise, specifying the equations as a set of T period equations, with M observations stacked 
one over another for each equation we derive the following equation: 
't M t it M M t ty J X I Jα β µ λ ε= + + + +  (4) 
for 1,2,...,t T= , where MJ is a M -element unit vector, MI is the M -element identity matrix , and 
µ is a vector containing all the cross-section effects, 1 2' ( , ,..., )Mµ µ µ µ= . 
Imposing the stacked representation and specifying the equations as cross-sectional, we have: 
 
( ) ( )MT M T M Ty J X I J J Iα β µ λ ε= + + ⊗ + ⊗ +   (5) 
 
With error covariance matrix: 
 
1 1 2 1 1
2 1
1
' ' '
'
( ')
' '
M
M M M
E E
ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε
εε
ε ε ε ε
 
 
 
 Ω = =
 
 
 
 
M O M
L
  (6) 
 
If we organize the equations as period specific, the representation is given by: 
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( ) ( )MT M T M Ty J X I I I Jα β µ λ ε= + + ⊗ + ⊗ +  (7) 
 
With error covariance matrix: 
 
1 1 2 1 1
2 1
1
' ' '
'
( ')
' '
T
T T T
E E
ε ε ε ε ε ε
ε ε
εε
ε ε ε ε
 
 
 
 Ω = =
 
 
 
 
M O M
L
  (8) 
 
 
3.2 Fixed and Random effects 
 
We are able to incorporate the presence of cross-sectional and periodical terms µ  and λ using 
the fixed or random effects. 
 
3.3 Fixed Effects 
  
If the i
µ
 and t
λ
are assumed as fixed parameters and the remaining error term  it
ε
 is assumed to 
be independent and identically distributed, then (2) represents a two-way fixed effects model. The 
following Q  is the Within transformation operator of fixed effect: 
1
' 'ˆ
OLS i i i i
i i
X QX X Qyβ
−
   
=    
   
∑ ∑
  (9) 
 
Where  
M T M T M T M TQ I I I J J I J J= ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗ + ⊗
    (10) 
 
3.4 Random Effects 
 
If the i
µ
 , t
λ
 and the error term  it
ε
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed, 
with mean zero and finite variance and assume also that they  independent of each other,  then 
this represents a two-way fixed effects model. From (2), we can estimate the covariance matrix to 
perform the  first step of  Generalized Least Squared(GLS) method : 
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( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2( ') M T M T M TE I J J I I Iµ λ εεε σ σ σΩ = = ⊗ + ⊗ + ⊗  (11) 
 
 
In the computation of  the matrix  we use one of the quadratic unbiased estimators (QUE) from  
Swamy-Arora, Wallace-Hussain, or Wansbeek- Kapteyn. The moment estimates of the component 
variances 
( )2 2 2, ,µ λ εσ σ σ  are computed using the expected values from the quadratic forms in one or 
more sets of first-stage estimated residuals.  The method of Swamy-Arora uses residuals from fixed 
effect and means regression. The Wallace-Hussain uses only OLS residuals. The Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn uses residuals from fixed effects estimator. 
After estimating the component variances, we construct an estimator for the residual covariance, 
and perform the GLS transformation of the dependent and regressor. The cross-sectional GLS 
estimator is the according: 
 
 
1
' 1 ' 1ˆ ˆ ˆ
GLS i M i i M i
i i
X X X yβ
−
− −   = Ω Ω   
   
∑ ∑
 (12) 
 
 
 
3.5 Hypothesis Testing 
 
Testing For Fixed Effects 
  
We could test the joint significance of the dummy variables: 
 
0 1 1... 0Mµ µ −Η : = = =   and 1 1... 0λ λΤ−= = =  
 
, by performing an F-test: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
, . .
/
/ . .
H
k d f
RRSS USSS k
F F
USSS d f
−
= 
 (13) 
 
This is a simple Chow test with the restricted residual sums of squares (RRSS) and the unrestricted 
residual sum of squares (USSS). 
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The RRSS is that from the pooled OLS regression of (1): 
 
%  %( ).
.
( ' ')i itit i it ity y X X u uβ− = − + −
 (14) 
 
The USSS is that from the Within regression in Fixed effects: 
 
 
% % %    % % %( ). . .. . ..
. . ..
( ' ' ' ')i t it tit i t it ity y y y X X X X u u u uβ− − − = − − − + − − −
 (15) 
 
With ( ) ( )( )
0
1 2 , 1 1
H
M T M T KF F + − − − −  
 
Following we can test the existence of individual effects allowing for time effects 
 
 
0 1 1... 0Mµ µ −Η : = = =   allowing 0Tλ ≠  for 1,2,..., 1t T= −  
 
The RRSS is based on the regression with time-series dummies only: 
 
 
%  %( ). .
.
( ' ')t tit t it ity y X X u uβ− = − + −
 (15) 
 
The USSS remains the same as (15). In this case F-statistic is ( ) ( )( )
0
2 1 , 1 1
H
M M T KF F − − − −  
 
Correspondingly, we can test the significance of time effects allowing for individual effects 
 
 
0 1 1... 0Tλ λ −Η : = = =   allowing 0iµ ≠  for 1,2,..., 1i M= −  
 
 
The RRSS is given by regression (14) and the USSS by regression (15). In this case F-statistic is  
( ) ( )( )
0
3 1 , 1 1
H
T M T KF F − − − − . 
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Hausman’s Specification Test 
 
A central assumption in Random effects estimation is the assumption that the random effects are 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (
( )/ 0it itE u X =  ). In the case ( )/ 0it itE u X ≠  the 
Random Effects estimator (
ˆ
GLSβ ) is biased.  Hausman(1978) suggest comparing  
ˆ
GLSβ  and 
ˆ
OLSβ  
under the null hypothesis 
( )0 / 0it itH E u X: = .  
 
A test statistic would be based on  
 
 
$
1
ˆ ˆ
GLS OLSq β β= −  (16) 
 
and under 0
H
,
$
1 0q = and 
$( )1 ˆcov , 0GLSq β =
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 Sources 
 
For the analysis yearly data are used from 80 countries. The panel ranges from 2001 to 2011. The 
countries chosen for the analysis are the ones with the widest possible time spam in yearly data 
necessary for accounting for all the control and institutional variables as they will be presented. 
The source of the data for the dependent variable and the control variables is the World 
Development Indicators from the World Bank. The sources of the data for the institutional 
variables are the Transparency International for the Corruption Perceptions Index and the World 
Bank’s World Governance Indicators for the three Institutional estimators. The countries are 
presented in the Table . 
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Countries in Data Set 
Australia France Panama 
Austria Gabon Peru 
Belarus Germany Philippines 
Belgium Greece Poland 
Benin Guatemala Portugal 
Bolivia Haiti Romania 
Brazil Honduras Russia 
Bulgaria Hungary Senegal 
Cambodia Iceland Singapore 
Cameroon India Slovakia 
Canada Indonesia Slovenia 
Chile Ireland South Africa 
China Israel Spain 
Colombia Italy Sweden 
Costa Rica Japan Switzerland 
Côte d´Ivoire Kenya Thailand 
Croatia Korea (South) Togo 
Cyprus Latvia Tunisia 
Czech Republic Lithuania Turkey 
Denmark Luxembourg Ukraine 
Dominican Republic Malaysia United Kingdom 
Ecuador Malta United States 
Egypt Mexico Uruguay 
El Salvador Morocco Vietnam 
Eritrea Netherlands  
Estonia New Zealand  
Ethiopia Nicaragua  
Finland Norway  
Table 4.1 :Sample of Countries 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
For the analysis there is a wide range of variables that are used. We will represent their descriptive 
statistics in separate sets. This approach is based on the Marques et al. (2010) that uses political 
and socio-economical factors to determine the drivers of renewable energy. 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable is the share of the Renewable resources on the total electricity 
production. Although we use data from electricity production like Carley (2011) and Marques et al. 
(2010; 2011), we prefer not to use the natural logarithms of the share of renewable.  This decision 
is based on the fact that it is crucial for the methodological approach of a two-way error 
component model to have balanced data. If we imply the natural logarithms we will have 
unbalanced data and we are able only to use the Fixed Effects from our panel methodology as 
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described in the previous chapter. The descriptive statistics and the histogram of the dependent 
variable are presented on the following table. 
 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Series: SELEC_RES
Sample 2001 2011
Observations 880
Mean       4.472989
Median   1.565000
Maximum  40.22000
Minimum  0.000000
Std. Dev.   6.748663
Skewness   2.107955
Kurtosis   6.955753
Jarque-Bera  1225.469
Probability  0.000000
 
Table 4.2   : Histogram and Descriptive statistics of the share of Renewable resources 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables that we have selected can be separated in two large sets. The one set 
includes variables that represent the economic and social situation of each state. The other set 
include the variables that represent the corruption and institutional estimates of the state. 
 
Socio-economic Factors 
 
In order to incorporate the strength of the other energy sources that contribute in the electricity 
production we use as variables their share. We consider the shares of natural gas, coal, 
hydroelectric, nuclear and oil on the total electricity production. The descriptive statistics of the 
common energy sources are presented on the following table . 
 
COMMON ENERGY SOURCES IN ELECTRICITY SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable SELC_NG SELEC_COAL SELEC_HYDRO SELEC_NUC SELEC_OIL 
Mean 20.98944 20.58257 26.64803 9.591773 17.83872 
Median 13.115 12.68 14.185 0 3.79 
Maximum 99.04 95.53 99.69 82.24 100 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Dev 24.93334 25.67439 28.07266 18.13091 27.6454 
Skewness 1.356414 1.321834 0.94161 2.025283 1.901966 
Kurtosis 4.058115 3.876701 2.721401 6.491629 5.529954 
Jarque-Berra 310.8981 284.4449 132.8849 1048.613 765.2539 
Prob 0 0 0 0 0 
Table 4.3 COMMON ENERGY SOURCES IN ELECTRICITY 
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It can be seen from the data that common energy sources retain their large share in electricity 
production compared to the share of renewable resources. The hydroelectric production seems to 
have the largest share with the share of nuclear electric production to be the smallest. The fossil 
fueled electricity production seems to have marginally the same share. 
 
It is also essential to consider the use of variables for the economic and social situation of the 
selected countries. Though, we consider as economic variables the natural logarithm of the 
available Gross Domestic Product per Capita and the share of the economic growth of the state. As 
a variable for the energy dependency of a country we use the data for the share of total energy 
imports over the total energy use. For the interpretation of the social apprehension of energy 
efficiency and the environmental concerns, we use the natural logarithms of the CO2 emission per 
capita and energy use per capita. The next Table presents the descriptive statistics of the 
socioeconomic variables. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
 
Corruption and Institutional Estimates 
 
 
For the scope of our analysis we use variables for the quality of the institutions. We use estimates 
for the control of corruption, the government effectiveness and the regulatory quality. We also use 
the Corruption Perception Index which is considered as the best estimate for the corruption of the 
institutions of a country The descriptive statistics of the corruption and the institutional estimates 
are presented on the following table. 
 
 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable LCO2PC LENERG_PC LGDP_PC ENERG_IM GROWTH 
Mean 1.150826 7.41549 8.7485 8.679409 3.465795 
Median 1.609478 7.660267 8.749805 39.04 3.635 
Maximum 3.211519 9.79615 11.38187 99.92 14.78 
Minimum -2.93549 4.834932 4.902382 -848.94 -17.95 
St. Dev 1.296603 1.01775 1.544526 129.1618 3.684868 
Skewness -0.962 -0.27808 -0.323128 -4.44569 -0.8242 
Kurtosis 3.252668 2.115913 2.121573 25.40954 6.44308 
Jarque-Berra 138.0735 40.00043 43.60696 21312.28 534.3073 
Prob 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.5 CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ESTIMATES 
 
 
5.   Results 
In the literature so far, the institutional drivers of the renewable resources were not examined 
thoroughly and the Random Effects models were not used. In this study we employ a group of 
different models as described in the methodological approach. First we use models that do not 
include any estimate for the performance of institutions in order to evaluate the performance of 
the variables that are widely referenced as common drivers for the implementation of the 
renewable. The results are presented on the following Table. 
 
 
Dependent Variable :SHAREOF RES OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITHOUT CORRUPTION ESTIMATE 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF OIL 
Coefficient -0.54789*** -0.539294*** -0.896555*** -0.845053*** -0.842510*** -0.824394*** -0.824394** 
t-stat -31.16833 -30.54706 -67.99869 -60.97112 -63.87007 -60.72866 -60.72866 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.509917*** -0.502653*** -0.678945*** -0.648962*** -0.650392*** -0.645510*** -0.645510*** 
t-stat -31.88041 -31.32871 -62.75951 -59.40602 -61.05172 -57.63196 -57.63196 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELECTRIC 
Coefficient -0.513417*** -0.504419*** -0.895027*** -0.841778** -0.837872*** -0.817503*** -0.817503*** 
t-stat -29.68424 -28.98949 -70.75144 -62.50575 -65.12580 -61.54417 -61.54417 
SHARE OF COAL 
Coefficient -0.547516*** -0.539795*** -0.917210*** -0.864831*** -0.864025*** -0.848024*** -0.848024*** 
t-stat -29.07068 -28.58450 -71.63261 -63.98530 -66.75099 -63.17899 -63.17899 
SHARE OF NG 
Coefficient -0.549498*** -0.543474*** -0.899586*** -0.860195*** -0.856285*** -0.838133** -0.838133*** 
t-stat -31.45583 -31.07389 -67.75774 -63.77009 -65.89719 -62.18748 -62.18748 
CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ESTIMATES SUMMARY STATISTICS  
Variable CPI CCor GovEff RegQ 
Mean 49.6915 0.379347 0.478432 0.49717 
Median 42 0.125 0.46 0.5275 
Maximum 99 2.55 2.43 2.03 
Minimum 14 -1.82 -1.68 -2.26 
St. Dev 23.89915 1.098039 1.019939 0.918992 
Skewness 0.551256 0.434204 0.024425 -0.290207 
Kurtosis 1.932719 1.92404 1.86987 2.197886 
Jarque-Berra 86.33611 70.10015 46.91792 35.94318 
Prob 0 0 0 0 
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LGDP PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.256283 0.197678 0.356849 -2.113067*** -1.520784*** -1.250282*** -1.250282*** 
t-stat 0.953619 0.729716 1.165379 -5.301194 -4.683159 -4.249188 -4.249188 
LENERGY USE 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.626456 0.626125 0.278117 0.423537 0.441638 0.453154 0.453154 
t-stat 1.37723 1.380456 0.703657 1.117756 1.202505 1.196453 1.196453 
LCO2 EMISSIONS 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.883998** -0.801137*** -0.189249 -0.077754 -0.085704 -0.079547 -0.079547 
t-stat -2.362673 -2.143853 -0.995689 -0.427445 -0.478481 -0.418486 -0.418486 
GDP GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.052748 -0.054321 -0.012595 0.000762 -0.002807 -0.004038 -0.004038 
t-stat -1.284877 -1.113019 -1.469097 0.074006 -0.278719 -0.372467 -0.372467 
 SHARE OF 
ENERGY IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.005143*** 0.005165*** 0.000224 -0.002469 -0.002039 -0.001887 -0.001887 
t-stat 4.307515 4.338549 0.137233 -1.561905 -1.367823 -1.281779 -1.281779 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 49.89009*** 49.56699*** 83.66496*** 99.51324*** 93.98079*** 89.90167*** 89.90167*** 
t-stat 13.73109 13.66522 25.56196 27.85190 30.92958 32.31446 32.31446 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATION 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
R-squared 0.623591 0.630719 0.988273 0.989509 0.866090 0.848162 0.889781 
Adjusted-R2 0.619259 0.622121 0.986951 0.988177 0.864549 0.846415 0.888641 
    Akaike info criterion 5.703351 5.706958 2.414150 2.325510 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.7631 5.821024 2.903005 2.868683 - - - 
Log-likehood -2498.474 -2490.062 -972.2259 -923.2243 - - - 
F-statistic 143.9656 73.35718 748.0160 743.0914 562.0437 485.4217 780.3751 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
Table 5.1  : OLS, FIXED EFFECTS AND RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITHOUT CORRUPTION 
ESTIMATE 
 
From the table we can conclude the following. First of all the application of the effects models 
increased the predictive ability. The Fixed Effects models that include the cross-sectional effects 
have the higher R-squared values than the respective models estimated with the Random Effects. 
The models estimated with the OLS and the Fixed Effects with period effects have the lower 
values. 
Furthermore, in all the different models estimated the coefficients of all the common energy 
methods in the electricity power are negative and highly statistically significant. All the coefficients 
tend to increase in absolute numbers, when applying models that have higher predictive ability.  In 
addition the constant term of the estimated model is also highly statistically significant, but 
positive with high values. 
 
Although there are some mixed results when we observe the estimates of the different socio-
economic variables that are considered in our models. The coefficient of the share of the GDP per 
capita in the OLS and the one way Fixed Effects models is positive, with no high value and not 
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significant. However, when why apply the two-way Fixed Effects and the Random Effects models it 
is statistical significant with high negative value. 
 
This is also the case in the coefficients of the share of energy imports. In the OLS and the one way 
Fixed Effects models the coefficient is positive, while in the remaining model is positive. The 
coefficients of the energy imports are highly significant only in the OLS and the model with the 
Fixed period Effects. 
The coefficients of the energy use per capita are all non significant with positive value. The 
estimates for the CO2 emissions per capita are all negative, with statistical significant only those in 
the OLS and the model with the Fixed period Effects. The economic growth has mostly negative 
coefficients, expect of the two-way Fixed effect model, although they are all non significant. 
 
A crucial question that arises is which methodology used performs better, by proving its results. 
For this reason we perform the hypothesis test as described in our methodology to examine the 
efficiency of our results. 
 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS  WITHOUT 
CORRUPTION ESTIMATE 
Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test Hausman-test Hausman-test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 310.964926 337.652688 28.526859 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 1.658247 - 9.188829 7.349890 0.348710 0.000000 
Probability 0.0862 - 0.0000 0.6921 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section and 
Period 
Statistic - - 305.669167 26.979634 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.0000 0.0026 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
test variance is 
invalid 
Cross-section test 
variance is invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is invalid 
Table 5.2:  Hypothesis testing for the Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models without Corruption estimate 
 
From the Hausman tests we can conclude that the Random effects estimators in all three different 
estimated models are not efficient and there is no presence of endogeneity. Especially in the 
Random Effects models that are estimated with the Wallace-Hussain and Swamy-Arora the test for 
the variance of the cross-section effect are invalid. From the F-test responsible for testing the 
heterogeneity of the models we can observe that they are all highly significant. So we should 
account for the observed heterogeneity.  
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 Models with Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
 
In this section the estimations of the models that include the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) are 
presented. The results are summarized on the following Table. 
Dependent Variable :SHAREOF 
RES OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX(CPI) 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTI
ON FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF OIL 
Coefficient -0.547822*** -0.538625*** -0.895954*** -0.845071*** -0.842525*** -0.825224*** -0.879803*** 
t-stat -31.11927 -30.44764 -67.88667 -60.93146 -63.82041 -60.82699 -67.55527 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.509713*** -0.501055*** -0.678836*** -0.649006*** -0.650404*** -0.645628*** -0.676698*** 
t-stat -31.55344 -30.86134 -62.74773 -59.34685 -60.96957 -57.67653 -63.12913 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELECTRI
C 
Coefficient -0.513330*** -0.503608*** -0.895145*** -0.841889*** -0.837892*** -0.818322*** -0.880443*** 
t-stat -29.61830 -28.85980 -70.75949 -62.36310 -64.94369 -61.51691 -70.85107 
SHARE OF COAL 
Coefficient -0.547481*** -0.539385*** -0.916998*** -0.864895*** -0.864043*** -0.848673*** -0.904355*** 
t-stat -29.04643 -28.53738 -71.60836 -63.91149 -66.62947 -63.17838 -71.13708 
SHARE OF NG 
Coefficient -0.549390*** -0.542584*** -0.899629*** -0.860277*** -0.856299*** -0.838876*** -0.883558*** 
t-stat -31.36234 -30.91900 -67.76224 -63.67509 -65.75311 -62.17670 -66.96791 
LCO2 
EMISSIONS PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.871152** -0.708561* -0.191084 -0.000709 -0.085783 -0.078332 -0.233179 
t-stat -2.182695 -1.772120 -1.005326 -0.429381 -0.478537 -0.412933 -1.271258 
LENERGY USE 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.613250 0.532703 0.297028 0.426008 0.441670 0.448063 - 
t-stat 1.286085 1.119655 0.750694 1.122308 1.199703 1.181094 - 
LGDP PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.238352 0.069865 0.376428 -2.107473*** -1.519758*** -1.278088*** 0.180973 
t-stat 0.719946 0.208939 1.226935 -5.256514 -4.602122 -4.188132 0.734480 
GDP GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.052832 -0.054800 -0.012677 0.000709 -0.002814 -0.003863 -0.010812 
t-stat -1.285876 -1.122344 -1.478610 0.068769 -0.279012 -0.356979 -1.241414 
 SHARE OF 
ENERGY 
IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.005128*** 0.005059*** 0.000160 -0.002474 -0.002038 -0.001899 -0.000374 
t-stat 4.253659 4.209202 0.098164 0.068769 -1.366533 -1.288078 -0.240930 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 50.06259*** 50.77804*** 83.74097*** 99.50476*** 93.97553*** 90.16728*** 86.60376*** 
t-stat 12.26217 12.45885 25.57915 27.82785 30.80951 31.98988 33.83726 
CPI Coefficient 0.001196* 0.008451 -0.007983 -0.001034 -4.54E-05 0.001614 -0.012039 
  t-stat 0.092845 0.652444 -1.018717 -0.137361 -0.006146 0.206910 -1.553392 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATION 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
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Table 5.3  : OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH CORRUPTION PERCEPTION 
INDEX (CPI) 
 
The estimations of the models with the CPI provide quite similar values with the previous models. 
There are only minor differences on the values of the estimates of the common energy methods 
and the constant, which remain highly significant with negative and positive effect respectively. 
The mixed coefficients of the socio-economic variables can also be observed in the various models. 
The share of energy imports and the economic growth have similar estimates with the previous 
models. The CO2 emissions per capita have negative values. Although only in the first two models 
the estimates are significant. On contrast the energy use per capita has positive values that are not 
significant.. The estimates of the GDP per capita are separated in the positive non significant and 
the negative highly significant. 
 
We should note that the variable of the energy use per capita is not included to the estimation of 
the Random effects with the Swamy-Arora method. This is done to avoid the presence of more 
variables than the cross-section number, a constrain of this method. When the model was 
estimated with its presence, the estimate was not significant. 
 
Regarding the estimates of the CPI that is the main addition to the estimations we can conclude 
the following. All the estimates have small value and they are mostly non significant. The only 
significant value is the one of the OLS model. There is also no clear evidence of the effect on the 
dependent variable because there are mixed results regarding of the signs of the estimates. 
Overall we can conclude that the CPI estimate is not a significant and consistent estimate for the 
quality of the institutions, when try to interpretate it as a variable for the growth of the renewable 
energy. 
Regarding the efficiency of the results of the models estimated the Table 5.4  summarizes the 
required tests. 
 
 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS WITH 
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX(CPI) 
R-squared 0.623594 0.630902 0.988288 0.989509 0.866091 0.849088 0.890231 
Adjusted-R2 0.618824 0.621869 0.986952 0.988162 0.864394 0.847176 0.888968 
    Akaike info criterion 5.705614 5.708735 2.415108 2.327758 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.770795 5.828233 2.909395 2.876363 - - - 
Log-likehood -2498.470 -2489.843 -971.6476 -923.2136 - - - 
F-statistic 130.7293 69.83754 739.7516 734.7353 510.3649 443.9734 704.7640 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
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Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 310.989748 337.056089 28.557810 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0027 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 1.698838 - 9.064771 7.417921 0.395775 0.000000 
Probability 0.0766 - 0.0000 0.7643 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
and Period 
Statistic - - 305.281771 28.240151 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.0000 0.0030 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is 
invalid 
 
Table 5.4:   Hypothesis testing for the Fixed Effects and Random Effects Models with Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) 
 
From the Hausman test we can reject the null hypothesis of the efficiency of the Random Effects 
estimations. On the contrary the Fixed effects estimates prove to be highly significant. 
 
 
Models with Control of Corruption Estimate 
 
In this section the models that include the Control of Corruption are summarized. The estimations 
results are presented on the following Table. 
Dependent Variable :SHAREOF 
RES OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH CONTROL OF CORRUPTION ESTIMATE 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTI
ON FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF OIL 
Coefficient -0.548311*** -0.538554*** -0.896204*** -0.845971*** -0.843657*** -0.825901*** -0.880879*** 
t-stat -31.09098 -30.35047 -68.26901 -60.78892 -63.67164 -60.57801 -68.29451 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.510751*** -0.501370*** -0.680967*** -0.650108*** -0.651649*** -0.646593*** -0.679396*** 
t-stat -31.50736 -30.72173 -63.08532 -58.93174 -63.67164 -57.15794 -63.98756 
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Table 5.5  : OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS with Control of Corruption Estimate 
 
The estimators of the shares of the common energy sources in electricity production are negative 
and highly significant. That is consistent with our previous findings. The constant is also positive 
and highly significant in all models estimated. 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELECTRIC 
Coefficient -0.513861*** -0.503637*** -0.896131*** -0.843119*** -0.839409*** -0.819323*** -0.881894*** 
t-stat -29.60109 -28.77843 -71.11721 -62.05402 -60.55534 -61.15814 -71.55937 
SHARE OF COAL 
Coefficient -0.547796*** -0.542466*** -0.916541*** -0.865707*** -0.865204*** -0.849576*** -0.904797*** 
t-stat -29.03986 -28.48442 -71.88395 -63.79916 -66.51316 -62.91962 -71.92340 
SHARE OF NG 
Coefficient -0.550153*** -0.542466*** -0.901841*** -0.861592*** -0.857898*** -0.839970*** -0.887428*** 
t-stat -31.26729 -30.73436 -68.10351 -63.26748 -65.31951 -61.61194 -67.99622 
LCO2 EMISSIONS 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.921966** -0.747361* -0.159425 -0.072055 -0.081337 -0.078425 -0.194607 
t-stat -2.349606 -1.898234 -0.841173 -0.395668 -0.453713 -0.413215 -1.068217 
LENERGY USE 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.661495 0.578099 0.362624 0.441849 0.460947 0.466298 - 
t-stat 1.413844 1.237969 0.918866 1.163400 1.251325 1.227956 - 
LGDP PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.320370 0.108678 0.305273 -2.077268*** -1.469205*** -1.216904*** 0.215642 
t-stat 0.958470 0.320218 0.999555 -5.173712 -4.441289 -3.973695 0.894567 
GDP GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.052269 -0.054910 -0.010003 0.001369 -0.002318 -0.003726 - 
t-stat -1.271715 -1.124126 -1.165172 0.132418 -0.229748 -0.343985 - 
 SHARE OF 
ENERGY 
IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.005210*** 0.005073*** -0.000370 -0.002573 -0.002113 -0.001925 -0.000849 
t-stat 4.296734 4.193967 -0.226080 -1.620966 -1.413730 -1.304459 -0.548077 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 49.19224*** 50.51727*** 83.72981*** 99.22055*** 93.56422*** 89.70009*** 86.04634*** 
t-stat 11.63045 11.93146 25.69406 27.60142 30.29742 31.17938 33.73821 
CON TROL 
CORRUPTION 
Coefficient -0.090552 0.124054 -0.533404*** -0.141267 -0.137874 -0.088777 -0.653231*** 
t-stat -0.322766 0.435689 -2.826623 -0.757199 -0.757727 -0.464523 -3.616367 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATION 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
R-squared 0.623636 0.630801 0.988390 0.989516 0.866277 0.848968 0.848968 
Adjusted-R2 0.618866 0.621765 0.987066 0.988170 0.864582 0.847054 0.847054 
    Akaike info criterion 5.705504 5.709009 2.406347 2.327047 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.770685 5.828508 2.900634 2.875651 - - - 
Log-likehood -2498.422 -2489.964 -967.7927 -922.9005 - - - 
F-statistic 130.7524 69.80713 746.3383 735.2638 511.1847 443.5562 443.5562 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
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The control of corruption is estimated to have negative values in the most of the models. Although 
only in two of the models the estimate is statistically significant. 
 
The CO2 emissions per capita is estimated to have negative values that are mainly non significant. 
Energy use estimates are positive and non significant, while economic growth estimates are 
negative but mostly non significant. The estimates for the energy imports and the GDP per capita 
does not seem to have major variations from the ones estimated but when they are significant 
their values are positive and negative respectively. 
 
The results of the hypothesis testing of the models are similar to the previous ones. The Random 
effects models’ estimators are non efficient, while the Fixed effect estimators are efficient. The 
results are presented on the following Table. 
 
 
 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS  WITH 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION ESTIMATE 
Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 313.778574 337.398426 28.52029 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.000000 0.000000 0.0027 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 1.665168 - 8.36755 7.427408 0.490999 0.000000 
Probability 0.0845 - 0.000000 0.7635 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
and Period 
Statistic - - 305.470699 29.253963 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.000000 0.0021 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is 
invalid 
Table  5.6 : FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS Hypothesis Testing with Control of Corruption 
Estimate 
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Models with Government Effectiveness Estimate. 
 
 
The estimations of the models that include the Government Effectiveness are presented on the 
following Table. 
Dependent Variable :SHAREOF RES 
OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS  WITH GOVVERMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
ESTIMATE 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTI
ON FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF OIL 
Coefficient -0.547749*** -0.538581*** -0.889102*** -0.843339*** -0.841231*** -0.823646*** -0.833035*** 
t-stat -31.14291 -30.49355 -67.34878 -60.88602 -63.85513 -60.81855 -62.70075 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.509788*** -0.502044*** -0.675350*** -0.648297*** -0.649905*** -0.645028*** -0.644763*** 
t-stat -31.85462 -31.27958 -62.77182 -59.45796 -61.14837 -57.80282 -60.08749 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELECTRIC 
Coefficient -0.513250*** -0.503603*** -0.886671*** -0.839763*** -0.836251*** -0.816413*** -0.828227*** 
t-stat -29.65640 -28.92394 -69.74216 -62.34763 -65.03597 -61.56377 -64.10453 
SHARE OF COAL 
Coefficient -0.548059*** -0.540688*** -0.906368*** -0.861345*** -0.860846*** -0.845421*** -0.852366*** 
t-stat -29.03956 -28.61291 -69.81193 -63.41548 -66.23257 -62.86343 -64.85581 
SHARE OF NG 
Coefficient -0.549289*** -0.542713*** -0.893722*** -0.858818*** -0.855304** -0.837794*** -0.847161*** 
t-stat -31.42148 -31.01395 -67.50195 -63.74216 -65.93535 -62.35487 -64.62454 
LCO2 EMISSIONS 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.841057** -0.697048* -0.195262 -0.086724 -0.096742 -0.090970 -0.020543 
t-stat 0.383906 -1.813141 -1.036697 -0.477726 -0.541322 -0.480536 -0.117107 
LENERGY USE PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.585285 0.532398 0.276323 0.403816 0.425201 0.447854 - 
t-stat 1.265889 1.155492 0.705519 1.067850 1.160360 1.186460 - 
LGDP PER CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.150595 -0.051604 0.557030* -1.859646* -1.224422*** -0.968961*** -1.063038*** 
t-stat 0.441499 -0.148714 1.810580 -4.482482 -3.548208 -3.002521 -3.566062 
GDP GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.054616 -0.060261 -0.010115 0.002495 -0.001148* -0.002336 0.000325 
t-stat -1.324426 -1.228088 -1.187384 0.8089 -0.114125 -0.215931 0.031451 
 SHARE OF ENERGY 
IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.005029*** 0.004905*** -0.000303 -0.002614* -0.002127 -0.001915 -0.002153 
t-stat 4.136150 4.048267 -0.187025 -1.655650 -1.429377 -1.303136 -1.458621 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 50.99617*** 52.12237*** 81.60182*** 97.47861*** 91.60170*** 87.61573*** 92.47283*** 
t-stat 12.00703 12.25269 24.83840 26.42547 28.73739 29.31441 30.72641 
GOVERNMENT 
EFFECTIVNESS  
Coefficient 0.168164 0.388080 -0.853375*** -0.463799** -0.503152** -0.493519** -0.455693** 
t-stat 0.503495 1.149231 -3.941025 -2.144623 -2.373039 -2.203510 -2.109073 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATION 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
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Table 5.7  : OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS with Government Effectiveness Estimate 
 
The estimations of the government effectiveness have some interesting results. Only the OLS and 
the Fixed periods effects models have a positive value for the government effectiveness that is 
although not significant. All the remaining Fixed effects and all the Random effects models , have 
high significant estimators that are negative.  
 
The common energy methods and the constant do not have any significant difference in their 
estimated values. The energy use per capita has positive but non significant values. The CO2 
emissions per capita variable has estimated negative values that are significant only for the first 
two types of models. The estimators of energy imports do not have many variations from the ones 
estimated with other models previously.  The GDP growth does not also have many major 
differences from the values that are formerly estimated. The estimator of the GDP per capita has 
some contradicting values, although those that are highly significant are consistent with our results 
so far. 
In the Hypothesis testing of the models there is no breakthrough. The Random Effects estimates 
remain inefficient with the Fixed Effects estimates highly efficient. The results are summarized on 
the following Table 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS WITH  
GOVVERMENT EFFECTIVENESS ESTIMATE 
Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 316.786146 338.732455 28.037076 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.0000 0.000000 0.0032 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 1.765365 - 8.000204 7.187106 0.341763 0.000000 
Probability 0.0629 - 0.000000 0.7837 0.000000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
and Period 
Statistic - - 307.039166 27.718796 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.000000 0.0036 1.0000 1.0000 
R-squared 0.623700 0.631287 0.988499 0.989570 0.867122 0.849614 0.860116 
Adjusted-R2 0.618932 0.622262 0.987187 0.988231 0.865438 0.847708 0.858506 
    Akaike info criterion 5.705332 5.707693 2.396929 2.321896 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.770513 5.827191 2.891216 2.870500 - - - 
Log-likehood -2498.346 -2489.385 -963.6486 -920.6340 - - - 
F-statistic 130.7884 69.95296 753.4838 739.1013 514.9365 445.8006 534.3294 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
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Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is 
invalid 
Table  5.8 : FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS Hypothesis Testing with Government 
Effectiveness Estimate 
 
 
Models with Regulatory Quality Estimate 
 
The models that include the estimate of the Regulatory Quality are presented on the following Table. 
Dependent Variable :SHAREOF RES OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH REGULATORY QUALITY ESTIMATE 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTI
ON FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF OIL 
Coefficient -0.549389*** -0.539780 -0.895161*** -0.845100*** -0.842516*** -0.822836*** -0.878601*** 
t-stat -31.67208 -31.08184 -67.66087 -60.92077 -63.81991 -60.48468 -67.24135 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.510373*** -0.502232*** -0.677916*** -0.649023*** -0.650435*** -0.644931*** -0.676108*** 
t-stat -32.34055 -31.82186 -62.49437 -59.33292 -60.97510 -57.39910 -62.87458 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELECTRIC 
Coefficient -0.516507*** -0.506518*** -0.893624*** -0.841820*** -0.837875** -0.815773*** -0.877856*** 
t-stat -30.24722 -29.58599 -70.37298 -62.45665 -65.07249 -61.25717 -70.15341 
SHARE OF COAL 
Coefficient -0.555574*** -0.547582*** -0.916274*** -0.864830*** -0.864004*** -0.846479*** -0.903208*** 
t-stat -29.78483 -29.39169 -71.45376 -63.94518 -66.70845 -62.90697 -70.83879 
SHARE OF NG 
Coefficient -0.546710*** -0.539593*** -0.899000*** -0.860178*** -0.856236*** -0.836553*** -0.882419*** 
t-stat -31.70324 -31.33749 -67.69046 -63.72633 -65.84936 -61.92926 -66.76024 
LCO2 EMISSIONS 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.639945* -0.517493 -0.157223 -0.081367 -0.088926 -0.086665 -0.210440 
t-stat -1.718413 -1.393938 -0.819682 -0.443198 -0.491813 -0.450867 -1.138959 
LENERGY USE PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.488979 0.478922 0.190661 0.434961 0.451501 0.488866 - 
t-stat 1.087487 1.071483 0.474802 1.124919 1.206281 1.267822 - 
LGDP PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.856510** -1.040508*** 0.468451 -2.133416*** -1.538705*** -1.317579*** 0.208107 
t-stat -2.467912 -2.972669 1.466386 -5.066386 -4.395640 -4.060213 0.823781 
GDP GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.059593 -0.066695 -0.012298 0.000691 -0.002867 -0.004121 -0.010567 
t-stat -1.470414 -1.387707 -1.434350 0.066938 -0.284222 -0.377664 -1.210147 
 SHARE OF ENERGY 
IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.003357*** 0.003214*** 0.000169 -0.002469 -0.002041 -0.001917 -0.000339 
t-stat 2.725381 2.625297 0.103472 -1.560773 -1.368425 -1.302125 -0.218417 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 59.68512*** 60.33288*** 83.32251*** 99.59791*** 94.05387*** 90.04454*** 85.75221*** 
t-stat 14.58958 14.79710 25.37228 27.52035 30.43568 31.65176 32.43929 
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Table 5.9   : OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS with Regulatory Quality Estimate 
 
The estimators of the constant and the common energy sources are consistent with our previous findings. 
The values of the estimates of the CO2 emissions and energy use per capita are positive and negative 
respectively, but with no significance level. The economic growth remains with negative estimators that are 
not significant. The estimators of the GDP per capita are highly significant with negative values. Only the 
two non significant estimators have positive values. The estimated values for the energy imports have only 
marginal differences from the estimators of the previous models. 
The estimators of the Regulatory Quality seem to have some variations. Although the majority of them are 
positive some models provide negative values. Only the OLS and the Fixed periods effects models have 
values that are the higher of all and are highly significant.  The remaining models have estimators that are 
not significant and with lesser value. 
In the Hypothesis testing the Random effects models still remain inefficient. The Fixed Effects models are 
highly efficient. The summary of the test are presented on the Table below. 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS  WITH 
REGULATORY QUALITY ESTIMATE 
Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 302.292384 325.593245 29.836182 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.0000 0.000000 0.0017 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 2.186713 - 9.015254 7.401592 0.242728 0.000000 
Probability 0.0167 - 0.000000 0.7657 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
and Period 
Statistic - - 296.598561 27.015598 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.000000 0.0046 1.0000 1.0000 
REGUALATORY 
QUALITY 
Coefficient 1.888374*** 2.073196*** -0.254365 0.030568 0.027441 0.091243 -0.311676 
t-stat 4.969546 5.455588 -1.221384 0.8803 0.137030 0.6699 -1.503691 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATION 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
R-squared 0.634004 0.643100 0.988295 0.989509 0.866071 0.847043 0.889687 
Adjusted-R2 0.629366 0.634365 0.986959 0.988162 0.864374 0.845105 0.888417 
    Akaike info criterion 5.677569 5.675129 2.414534 2.327753 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.742750 5.794628 2.908821 2.876358 - - - 
Log-likehood -2486.130 -2475.057 -971.3948 -923.2114 - - - 
F-statistic 136.6918 73.62067 740.1817 734.7390 510.2786 436.9819 700.8565 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
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Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is 
invalid 
Table 5.10  : FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS Hypothesis Testing with Regulatory Quality 
Estimate 
 
 
Models with three different Institutional Estimates 
 
In order to investigate more though roughly, how the institutions and their operations have effect 
on the share of the renewable resources, we estimate models that include the three different 
estimates for the institution’s performance. Those three estimates are the Control of Corruption, 
the Government Effectiveness and the Regulatory Quality. We apply the same methodology of 
Fixed and Random Effects. In the Random Effects models with the Swamy-Arora method we 
exclude the non significant socio-economic variables to include the institutional estimates.  The 
estimations can be summarized in the following Table. 
 
Dependent Variable 
:SHAREOF RES OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH THREE INSTITUTIONAL ESTIMATES 
Type of Model OLS 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTI
ON FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
SHARE OF 
OIL 
Coefficient -0.553599*** -0.543883*** -0.890404*** -0.843589*** -0.841202*** -0.822143*** -0.832592*** 
t-stat -31.99977 -31.26957 -67.30169 -60.43705 -63.31672 -60.07345 -62.09228 
SHARE OF 
NUCLEAR 
Coefficient -0.515713*** -0.506533*** -0.677421*** -0.648867*** -0.650261*** -0.644672*** -0.644148*** 
t-stat -32.00758 -31.26120 -62.44626 -58.62296 -60.21594 -56.62586 -59.16993 
SHARE OF 
HYDROELEC
TRIC 
Coefficient -0.522173*** -0.511955*** -0.888889*** -0.840007*** -0.836165*** -0.814649*** -0.826261*** 
t-stat -30.61682 -29.80413 -69.45156 -61.43357 -64.01715 -60.35606 -62.64642 
SHARE OF 
COAL 
Coefficient -0.558391*** -0.550020*** -0.907558*** -0.860956*** -0.860235*** -0.843299*** -0.851848*** 
t-stat -29.86643 -29.34652 -69.71184 -62.72319 -65.35037 -61.60069 -63.99507 
SHARE OF 
NG 
Coefficient -0.549497*** -0.541915*** -0.895892*** -0.858743*** -0.854882*** -0.835514*** -0.846125*** 
t-stat -31.72597 -31.22159 -67.22165 -62.83394 -64.86693 -60.96697 -63.58427 
LCO2 
EMISSIONS 
PER CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.987071** -0.810442 -0.195866 -0.113372 -0.126245 -0.132007 -0.032636 
t-stat -2.570158 -2.104585 -1.027247 -0.616957 -0.697716 -0.686536 -0.184685 
LENERGY 
USE PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient 0.884556* 0.802950* 0.373698 0.487548 0.507593 0.533316 - 
t-stat 1.927560 1.753915 0.929641 1.254020 1.347141 1.372810 - 
LGDP PER 
CAPITA 
Coefficient -0.510148 -0.731795** 0.445648 -1.960073*** -1.325265*** -1.078021*** -1.098440*** 
t-stat -1.430700 -2.021857 1.383126 -4.591685 -3.710336 -3.214806 -3.611446 
GDP 
GROWTH 
Coefficient -0.047385 -0.052670 -0.009053 0.002372 -0.001329 -0.002785 - 
t-stat -1.171937 -1.092261 -1.058874 0.229583 -0.131913 -0.256309 - 
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 SHARE OF 
ENERGY 
IMPORTS 
Coefficient 0.003302*** 0.003163*** -0.000558 -0.002656* -0.002164 -0.001934 - 
t-stat 2.699711 2.594660 -0.342192 -1.675672 -1.450121 -1.313478 - 
CONSTANT 
Coefficient 54.60182*** 56.00768*** 82.02968*** 97.71014*** 91.81545*** 87.71869*** 92.60491*** 
t-stat 12.79595 13.10472 24.87729 26.42003 28.71683 29.21305 32.05772 
CON TROL 
CORRUPTIO
N 
Coefficient -0.432942 -0.242267 -0.302068 -0.028013 -0.005915 0.057752 0.108632 
t-stat -0.964359 -0.536976 -1.444156 -0.137435 -0.029545 0.271174 0.537191 
GOVERNME
NT 
EFFECTIVNE
SS  
Coefficient -1.334571** -1.297029** -0.771510*** -0.538473** -0.593660** -0.648059** -0.575472** 
t-stat -2.145460 -2.084517 -3.092706 -2.211050 -2.463141 -2.506541 -2.337904 
REGUALATO
RY QUALITY 
Coefficient 3.24391*** 3.242314*** 0.143522 0.222819 0.235621 0.300958 0.184026 
t-stat 6.311086 6.332978 0.626969 1.009091 1.076856 1.281629 0.843234 
EFFFECT 
SPECIFICATI
ON 
Cross-
sectional NO NO YES-FIXED YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
Period NO YES-FIXED NO YES-FIXED 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
YES-
RANDOM 
R-squared 0.640823 0.648025 0.988531 0.989584 0.867257 0.848987 0.859371 
Adjusted-R2 0.635431 0.638568 0.987191 0.988216 0.865264 0.846720 0.857752 
    Akaike info criterion 5.663308 5.665779 2.398655 2.325129 - - - 
    Schwarz criterion 5.739352 5.796140 2.903806 2.884597 - - - 
Log-likehood -2477.855 -2468.943 -962.4083 -920.0568 - - - 
F-statistic 118.8512 68.52140 737.3347 723.7075 435.2205 374.5070 531.0363 
ProbF-stat 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
*   10% level of significance  **   5% level of significance  ***   1% level of significance 
Table 5.11  : OLS- FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS with Institutional Estimates 
 
From the three institutional estimates only one is highly statistical significant in all the models. 
Especially Government Effectiveness is highly significant in all models with negative values. Control 
of Corruption estimators are negative in the most of the models and only in some of the Random 
Effects models they have positive values. Despite the different signs they are not statistically 
significant. Regulatory Quality estimate has estimators that are positive in all models. Only the 
estimators of the OLS and the Fixed periods model are highly significant. 
 
The estimators of the share of common energy sources and the constant are similar with the ones 
of the previous models that were estimated. The estimators of the CO2 emissions are all non 
significant expect the OLS estimator and they all have negative values. The estimators of energy 
use have all positive values but only the one of the first two models are significant. The estimators 
of GDP per capita have negative values and are mostly highly significant. The economic growth has 
mostly negative values except the one of the two-way Fixed Effects model that is positive. 
However, they are all non significant. The share of energy imports has estimators that are positive 
and highly significant only in the first two models. The remaining estimators of the imports are 
negative and mostly non significant. 
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 As it is concluded in the previous table the most predictive model remains the Fixed Effects model 
with both cross-sectional and period effects. That is consistent with all our results of the empirical 
method. The Fixed Effects models have highly efficient estimators, while the Random Effects 
estimators are inefficient. The summary of the Hypothesis Tests is present on the following Table. 
 
 
FE-RE MODELS 
FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS HYPOTHESIS TESTS   WITH THREE 
INSTITUTIONAL ESTIMATES 
Type of Model 
FE-FIXED 
PERIOD 
FE-
CROSSSECTION 
FIXED FE-2WAY 
RE  
Wansbeek- 
Kapteyn  
RE Wallace -
Hussain 
 RE Swamy -
Arora 
Hypothesis Test F-test F-test F-test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Hausman-
test 
Cross-section 
Statistic - 302.030263 322.514193 29.562647 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - 0.000000 0.000000 0.0054 1.0000 1.0000 
Period 
Statistic 1.751637 - 7.85066 7.309839 0.459354 0.000000 
Probability 0.0656 - 0.000000 0.8855 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-section 
and Period 
Statistic - - 292.313386 30.139351 0.000000 0.000000 
Probability - - 0.000000 0.0045 1.0000 1.0000 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
Cross-
section test 
variance is 
invalid 
  
Period test 
variance is 
invalid 
Table 5.12  : FIXED EFFECTS-RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS Hypothesis Testing with Institutional 
Estimates 
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6. Conclusions 
To sum up in this study, we investigate the drivers for the growth of renewable energy. The 
analysis includes not only socio-economic factors but also estimates for the corruption and the 
performance of the institutions. For this study eighty countries from all continents and types of 
economies were being examined with yearly data. The year range is from 2001 to 2011. 
This study used additional estimates for socio-economic situation of the countries, as they were 
widely used in the literature. Based on the literature’s evidence we applied also estimates for the 
corruption and the institutional performance to investigate their effect on the growth of the share 
of the renewable energy. 
The analysis was based on the Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. The validity of the 
estimations was controlled by the special test that adequate for each model. Those are the F-test 
and the Hausman test respectively. First we estimate the different models not accounting for any 
institutional variable. Then we re-estimate the models taking in to consideration different types of 
estimates. Those were the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Control of Corruption estimate, 
the Government Effectiveness estimate and the Regulatory Quality estimate. From all the 
estimated models some major conclusions can be driven. 
The shares of the common energy methods in electricity production are proven to be highly 
significant in all the models estimated. Especially their estimated values are all negative proving 
that they are the main factors for the diminishing penetration of the renewable energy methods in 
the electricity production. This also supports the theory of the lobbing pressure of those proven 
and widely used energy methods. 
The emissions of CO2 per capita have mainly a negative effect on the growth of the renewable 
energy resources. That is consistent with the literature that states that countries with more 
emissions are less willing to implement Renewable Energy Policies. However the significance of the 
estimates is limited only to the OLS and the Fixed periods effects models. In all the other models 
the estimators are not significant. 
The energy use per capita has a positive effect on the share of renewable energy. However, very 
few of the estimators were found significant with the overall number of the estimators to be non 
significant. Our results are consistent with the literature which states that countries with high 
energy use are the ones that first turn their attention towards renewable energy. 
The GDP per capita has a majority of estimators that are proven to be highly significant in many 
models. Those estimates are negative with high values. On the contrary the estimators that are 
non significant have mainly positive values. Those results suggest that countries with higher GDP 
are more reluctant on enforcing renewable energy policies. 
The Growth of GDP has mainly negative and non significant effect on the share of renewable in 
electricity. However, the estimators of the two-way Fixed Effects models are all positive but still 
not significant. This specific result is consistent with the latest advances in literature, where 
modern estimation methods prove a positive link between renewable energy and economic 
growth. 
   Page 
33 
 
  
The estimators of the share of energy imports have the widest range. When they are estimated 
with the OLS and the one-way Fixed Effects models the coefficients are positive and highly 
significant. However, when estimated with the two-way Fixed Effects model and the Random 
effects models they are found negative and non significant. The high share of energy imports 
should lead a state to promote renewable energy for reducing its imports and having security of 
supply .Although this assumption is consistent with the positive values, the negative values 
possible reflect the power that conventional energy have.  
Regarding the results of the models with the estimates of the corruption and the institutional 
performance the following conclusions can be made. For the CPI only one estimator is quite 
significant and is the estimator of the OLS model. All the other estimators are not significant. 
Moreover the signs of the coefficients are mixed with no clear indication for the link between 
renewable energy and corruption. The marginal majority of negative coefficients suggest that 
possibly there is a link between the higher level of corruption and the greater penetration of 
renewable energy. 
Those finding are supported by the estimators of the Control of Corruption. In all models, except 
the one with Fixed period Effects, the values of the coefficients are negative and in some cases 
they are and significant also. We can conclude that the link between corruption and the growth of 
renewable energy sources seems to be present but it turns to be not significant. 
The more robust results of the poor institutional performance and the growth of renewable are 
found with the Government Effectiveness estimate. In the OLS and the one-way Fixed Effects 
model it is positive and non significant. However in the remaining Fixed-Effects and Random 
Effects models it is negative and highly significant. This is the first significant estimation of the link 
between poor institutions in countries and the increase of renewable energy applications in their 
territory 
The models that account for the Regulatory Quality are only the OLS and the one-way Fixed Effects 
model, where the estimates are positive and highly significant. In all the other models the 
estimates are not significant. That is essentially the case where a solid institutional framework 
leads to the advance of renewable energy. 
The conclusions for the corruption and institutional estimates are presented in the model that 
considers all three institutional estimates. The only link that remains significant is the one with the 
poor Government Effectiveness and the increase on share of the renewable energy. The other two 
links are non-significant but they are present in all the models. So we could suggest the possible 
presence of a link between the increase of Corruption and the increase of the renewable 
resources. Also a positive link between effective Regulatory Institutions and the share of 
renewable energy can be established. 
Regarding the methodology the estimates of the Random Effects models are tested and proven to 
be not efficient. On the contrast the estimates of the Fixed Effects models are highly efficient 
suggesting the presence of heterogeneity in the estimated models. Although the problem of 
endogenity is not present, the test applied does not account for serial-correlation or 
heteroscedasticity. The implementation of more advance methodological approach, like the 
Generalized Method of Moments, is essential to examine further the robustness of our results. 
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